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HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN NIGERIA ACROSS TIME: TRAJECTORY, 
SUCCESSES AND POTENTIALS FOR CANADIAN-NIGERIAN ENGAGEMENT 
 
 
SOLOMON UKHUEGBE* 
 
Abstract 
Canada has, for decades, been actively involved in funding and providing support for the 
development of legal and political institutions and rights advocacy activities in Nigeria. A 
careful documentation and assessment of this support will likely show that its impact has been 
significant and perhaps critical in some areas. This article, however, considers a different form 
of engagement, or rather, a possible engagement. Although Canada’s human rights 
jurisprudence, especially the Charter of Rights case law, is highly regarded the world over, its 
influence on Nigerian courts has been limited. Yet, there is a great opportunity for meaningful 
engagement here, especially as Canadian universities are increasingly a preferred destination 
for graduate training by Nigerian lawyers and legal scholars, and knowledge of Canadian legal 
resources is disseminated through other engagement projects between the two countries. This 
article therefore considers the potentials for judicial engagement between Nigerian and 
Canadian courts on human rights. Part I provides a brief background. Parts II and III map the 
deferential and activist phases of the trajectory of human rights discourses in Nigeria, 
respectively. Part IV considers some possible sites of judicial engagement as between Nigerian 
and Canadian courts. In conclusion, Part V identifies certain inherent limits of this possible 
engagement. 
 
 
1. LIKE THE TYPICAL COMMONWEALTH COURTS of its time, when the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria heard its first rights cases at the beginning of the 1960s, it was very unfamiliar 
with the concept of a constitutional bill of rights.  In fact, before Nigeria adopted its bill of 
rights, there were only three constitutional bills of rights in the entire British Commonwealth1 
(which is constituted largely of Britain and almost all of its former colonies).2  Of the three 
countries that possessed these bills of rights, only India had a sizeable (though then largely 
                                                 
* Department of Public Law, University of Benin, Nigeria; PhD (Osgoode Hall), Barrister; email: 
solomon.ukhuegbe@gmail.com 
1 There is no attempt here to explore the subject in the general context of the borrowing and migration of 
constitutional ideas. See e.g. Vlad Perju, “Constitutional Transplants, Borrowings, and Migrations” in Michel 
Rosenfeld & Andras Sajo, eds, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012) 1304; Sujit Choudhry, ed, The Migration of Constitutional Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
2 See Charles OH Parkinson, Bill of Rights and Decolonization: The Emergence of Domestic Human Rights 
Instruments in Britain’s Overseas Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at Chapter 6; Solomon 
Ukhuegbe, “The Formal Evolution of the Nigerian Bill of Rights: From the Willink Commission Proposal to the 
1999 Constitution” in Epiphany Azinge, ed, Nigeria: A Century of Constitutional Evolution 1914-2014 (Lagos: 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2013) 620. 
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formalistic) rights jurisprudence accreted by 1961. The other two countries offered almost 
nothing in the form of precedent to the Nigerians (Pakistan’s constitution was suspended, and 
Malaysia’s was practically contemporaneous with Nigeria’s). Beyond these there was the 
quasi-constitutional Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960, this Canadian legislation also did not add 
significantly to the pre-existing body of precedent. It was not until 1963, two years behind the 
Nigerian Supreme court, that the Supreme Court of Canada first considered any provisions of 
the Canadian Bill of Rights the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came much later3). 
Even so, over the following two decades, the Supreme Court of Canada produced highly 
deferential, legalistic, rights-related case law.4 However, it must be noted that Canada also 
possessed a small but quite impressive “implied bill of rights” jurisprudence that it developed 
in the 1950s,5 which could have provided a valuable resource for Nigerian courts. 
 
II. THE INITIAL PATH: THE TEPID RECEPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
IN NIGERIA 
A. HUMAN RIGHTS AND JUDICIAL POLICY 
The initial judicial encounter with the Nigerian bill of rights was anything but encouraging. 
Indeed, this experience minimized this bill of rights as a site of public policy-making for several 
years to come. By the 1960s, observers had noticed near complete absence of any successful 
claim against the government for the violation of human rights. BO Nwabueze, Africa’s ablest 
                                                 
3 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada 
Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. 
4 See WS Tarnopolsky, “The Canadian Bill of Rights: From Diefenbaker to Drybones” (1971) 17:3 McGill LJ 
437; Paul Weiler, In the Last Resort: A Critical Study of the Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Carswell, 1974) 
at 186-224; Berend Hovius, “The Legacy of the Supreme Court of Canada’s Approach to the Canadian Bill of 
Rights: Prospects for the Charter” (1982) 28 McGill LJ 31. 
5 See e.g. Chike Obi, [1961] 1 SCNLR 197; Boucher v R [1951] SCR 265, 99 CCC 1. In Chike Obi, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria would have benefited greatly from the solution established in Boucher v R, a case Paul Weiler 
correctly identifies as “a text-book example of judicial craftsmanship.” Weiler, supra note 4 at 191. See also Gary 
Botting, Fundamental Freedoms and Jehovah’s Witnesses (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1993) at 52-54. 
Remarkably, this case was not brought to the Court’s attention. This is curious because at this time, the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria was already quite familiar with Canadian federalism case law. Perhaps the explanation is that 
the latter was largely the work of the Privy Council. 
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constitutional scholar, notes that “[t]he point here is not that every one of the decisions handed 
down by the Nigerian Supreme Court between 1960 and 1963 was necessarily wrong in law, 
but that they should all have gone in favor of the government was remarkable.”6  This 
observation bears close examination. 
The Court did not have the opportunity to decide any matter pertaining to the 
fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution until 1961. However, in that year alone, it 
decided about half a dozen human rights cases.7 The first two cases, decided on April 6th, 1961, 
questioned of the constitutionality of the offence of sedition under the Criminal Code in light 
of the constitutional protection of the freedom of expression. Under Section 24 of the 1960 
Independence Constitution, 
(1) Every one shall be entitled to freedom of expression, including freedom to hold 
opinions and impart ideas and information without interference;  
(2) Nothing in this section shall invalidate any law that is reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society – 
(a) in the interest of defense, public safety, public order, public morality or 
public health; 
(b) for the purpose of protecting the rights, reputations and freedoms of other 
persons, preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, 
maintaining the authority and independence of the Courts or regulating 
telephony, wireless broadcasting, television or the exhibition of cinematograph 
films; or 
(c) imposing obligations upon persons holding office under the Crown, 
members of the armed forces of the Crown or members of a police force. 
 
The two cases were references from the High Court in the course of a criminal trial for 
seditious publication. In the first case, DPP v Chike Obi,8 a leader of an opposition political 
party was prosecuted on a charge that he distributed a pamphlet entitled: “The People: Facts 
that You Must Know.” As noted in the decision of the court in this case, that pamphlet 
contained the following allegedly seditious statement: 
                                                 
6 BO Nwabueze, Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa: The Role of the Courts in Government (London: C Hurst 
& Co, 1977) 242. 
7 Some of these cases actually arose under the original provisions, the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of 1954. 
But the appeals/references were filed at the Supreme Court between 1960 and 1961. 
8 [1961] 1 SCNLR 197. 
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Down with the enemies of the people, the exploiters of the weak and oppressors of the 
poor! …The days of those who have enriched themselves at the expense of the poor are 
numbered. The common man in Nigeria can today no longer be fooled by sweet talk at 
election time only to be exploited and treated like dirt after the booty of office has been 
shared among the politicians. 
 
The charge was brought under Section 51(c) of the Criminal Code, which makes it 
punishable for anyone to print, publish, sell, offer for sale, distribute, or reproduce any seditious 
publication.  A “seditious intention” is defined by the Code as, inter alia, an intention to bring 
the government into hatred or contempt or excite disaffection against it. In the determination 
of the scope of the Nigerian provision, defendant’s counsel invited the Court to be guided by 
judicial approaches to similar constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression elsewhere. 
Admittedly, by 1961, there were not many such constitutions in the Commonwealth. The only 
obvious case was India.  The Court however was more eager to distinguish the Indian provision. 
At the same time, the Court was not concerned with exploring the possible scope of the 
freedom of expression in the Nigerian Constitution.  It was instead simply satisfied that, under 
the extant criminal law, the publication was seditious. The more appropriate course would have 
been to consider the extent to which the criminal law was affected by the nascent constitutional 
protection. It would surely be remarkable if the freedom of expression was not intended to 
affect the extant criminalization of political speech, especially where, as in this case, it did not 
involve a direct incitement of violence.9 How else are the democratic channels to be kept 
accessible unless the opposition can lawfully criticize the government, however harshly? The 
Court was clearly not persuaded by this consideration.  
It was argued that a law is only valid if the acts prohibited are, in every case, likely to 
lead directly to disorder. It seems to me that this is taking too narrow a view of the 
provision, for it must be justifiable in a democratic society to take reasonable 
precautions to preserve public order, and this may involve the prohibition of acts which, 
if unchecked and unrestrained, might lead to disorder, even though those acts would 
                                                 
9 The leading authority on the point, decided by the West African Court of Appeal (WACA) before the adoption 
of the Bill of Rights, was that an incitement to violence was not a necessary element of the offence. See R v 
Wallace Johnson (1939) 5 WACA 56.   For the Privy Council’s position, see [1940] AC 231, [1940] 1 All ER 
241 (PC). 
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not themselves do so directly. The Court must be the arbiter of whether or not any 
particular law is reasonably justifiable.10 
 
The closing sentence of the foregoing passage was probably not intended to convey any 
assurance that the judiciary in principle intended to hold the government to the high standard 
implicated by the constitutional guarantees. Earlier in the same opinion, it also stated that “it is 
right that the courts should remember that their function is to decide whether a restriction is 
reasonably justifiable in a democratic society, not to impose their own views of what the law 
ought to be.11 
 It is noteworthy that in practically every other constitutional challenge under the bill of 
rights in the 1960s, the Court equally never found it, in its own words, “necessary to enter into 
any lengthy consideration of the question.”12 By the end of the 1960s, the Supreme Court had 
so profoundly discounted the potential of the bill of rights that it was of little or no political 
significance. The very purpose that had justified the introduction of the bill of rights only a few 
years earlier, i.e. the protection of ethnic and political minorities, hardly featured in judicial 
decision-making. One interesting feature of the Supreme Court’s decision-making during this 
era was that the odds were often stacked against the claimant in human rights cases. The natural 
consequence is that the legislation or official action impugned is almost inevitably sustained. 
“To what purpose, people were prompted to ask,” noted Nwabueze, “were civil liberties 
guaranteed in the Constitution if every violation of them, however flagrant-seeming, received 
the sanction of the courts?” 
It began to look as if the courts were actively aiding the politicians in the persecution 
of opponents and in the perversion of the Constitution. Confidence in their ability to 
decide political issues impartially was consequently undermined, and the position was 
                                                 
10 [1961] 1 SCNLR 197 at 207. 
11  Ibid at 208 [emphasis added].  
12 The attitude of the Supreme Court was presaged by a statement made extra-judicially by Justice Lionel Brett, a 
leading member of the Court in the 1960s at an international conference on Nigerian federalism in August 1960. 
“In cases involving the Fundamental Rights,” he said, “the Nigerian courts will have to consider what is 
‘reasonably justifiable in a democratic society,’ but even here the essential word is ‘justifiable,’ not ‘desirable,’ 
and the role of the courts is to preserve certain standards, not dictate policy.” See Lionel Brett, “The Role of the 
Judiciary in a Federal Constitution with Particular Reference to Nigeria” in Lionel Brett, ed, Constitutional 
Problems of Federalism in Nigeria (Lagos: Times Press, 1960) 12 at 22 [emphasis added]. 
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eventually reached where there was a general disinclination to take political complaints 
to them. To go to court on such matters was felt to be a vain effort; from past experience, 
a decision in favor of the government was considered a foregone conclusion. Moreover, 
the overconfident way in which the ruling politicians sometimes challenged opponents 
to take their complaints to court, as if to say they had been assured the courts would 
never decide against them, helped to sap public confidence in the courts still further.13 
 
 A number of studies of the judiciary in post-colonial Africa have also confirmed this. 
For instance, in his study of what he called the “illiberal and restrictive” practices of judicial 
interpretation of the Nigerian Constitution between 1960 and 1965, Gaius Ezejiofor highlighted 
the significance of this factor on judicial decision-making. The judges, he wrote, 
probably feared that an active interventionist policy of interpreting the Constitution in 
a liberal spirit would lead to open confrontation with the politicians and the consequent 
weakening of judicial authority. Consequently most of them were anxious to render 
decisions favorable to the government and its supporters. Indeed they behaved as if it 
was their duty to adopt challenged measures of the authorities as valid and to find 
arguments to justify them. … One of the very few occasions in which there was a 
departure from the literal and strict approach to interpretation was when it was 
necessary to hand down a decision not inconvenient to the Federal Government and its 
allies.14 
 Therefore, in the 60s, the Supreme Court of Nigeria lost the opportunity to apply 
emerging constitutional standards to the Criminal Code, a colonial statute reflecting, almost 
wholesale, Victorian-inspired criminal justice and values. The Court’s reticence effectively 
legitimized a Code which had been designed and implemented during colonial rule to stifle 
political dissent. 
B. LEGALISM 
Even the most able observers, including Nwabueze, were inclined to rationalize the 
problematic judicial practice principally as a condition fostered by, if not the direct result of, 
the received tradition of British positivism.  
[T]he primary reason seems to be the inherited common law attitude towards the 
judicial function; it is an attitude that requires literalness and analytical positivism in 
                                                 
13 Nwabueze, supra note 6 at 242-43. 
14 G Ezeijiofor, “A Judicial Interpretation of Constitution: The Nigerian Experience During the First Republic” in 
AB Kasunmu, ed, The Supreme Court of Nigeria, 1956-1970 (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1977) 67 at 87-88 [footnotes 
omitted]. 
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the interpretation of the law, enforces a narrowness of attitude towards the questions 
presented for decision, and discourages creative activism.15  
As a result, Nwabueze argues that, unlike their US counterparts, Commonwealth judges 
generally (and until lately at any rate) missed the opportunity for judicial creativity and failed 
to acknowledge the question of choice involved in the balancing of liberty against public order 
and the crucial judicial role implicated in the process.  
American bill of rights jurisprudence and creative constitutional interpretation was 
practically unknown to the Supreme Court of Nigeria until much later. Except to the limited 
extent of the Canadian implied rights jurisprudence, a legal resource of comparable quality to 
that of the United States was not yet available from British and other Commonwealth courts. 
In the absence of a constitutional charter of rights, most of the Commonwealth courts 
developed very limited rights jurisprudence.  
The Court constantly fixed its gaze on and loyally took its direction from the British 
courts, despite the fact that until very recently they generally had no cognate experience in bill 
of rights decision-making. However, the attraction came naturally. Until less than two decades 
ago, all Supreme Court Justices received their legal training partly or, in most cases, wholly in 
England, where they were immersed in the doctrine of the supremacy of Parliament and British 
skepticism of a constitutional bill of rights. 
Looking beyond the United Kingdom, the institutions of the European Court of Human 
Rights began developing in the 1970s and 80s from a significant, and soon to become highly 
influential, jurisprudence. It is remarkable that, even today, the Supreme Court of Nigeria still 
does not pay any serious attention to this or other similar sources. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Nwabueze, supra note 6 at 310 [emphasis added]. 
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III. RIGHTS ACTIVISM: LOOKING BEYOND DOMESTIC NORMS 
 
A. DICTATORSHIP AND THE LIMIT OF LAW 
For most of the period between the mid-1960s and 1999, democratic governance in Nigeria 
was replaced with military rule. One obvious characteristic of such regimes was normalization 
of extra-constitutional powers and legislative absolutism.16 The judiciary initially responded 
adroitly. On April 24th, 1970, the Supreme Court, in Lakanmi v Attorney General,17 took the 
unprecedented step of voiding certain legislation18 that purported to forfeit the assets of certain 
persons specifically named by statute. This, according to the Court, amounted to a legislative 
judgment, and was therefore ultra vires the lawful powers of the military government as an 
interim government of necessity. The government would have none of this. Within days, it 
promulgated appropriate legislation, in effect, nullifying the decision.19 It is a matter for regret 
that, at the earliest opportunity the Court (although quite understandably) quickly pulled back 
from a confrontation with this first military regime.20 
 
B. 1980s-1990s: OPPORTUNISTIC CO-OPTATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
It became clear during the decades following this development that domestic legal norms could 
no longer be deployed to effectively restrain the excesses of the regime. By the 1980s, human 
                                                 
16  See Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 1984 (Decree No 1), s 6 (“No question as to the validity of 
this or any other Decree or of any Edict shall be entertained by any court of law in Nigeria”). 
17 [1970] NSCC 143, (1971) 1 UILR 201. 
18  The Public Officers and Other Persons (Investigation of Assets) 1967 (Edict No 5); The Forfeiture of Assets 
etc (Validation) 1968 (Decree No 45). Two years earlier the Supreme Court had resolved the problem of conflict 
between legislation of the federal government (“Decree”) and of the state government (“Edict”) under the military 
dictatorship by assuming competence to set aside the latter in that event. See NK Adamolekun v Council of the 
University of Ibadan, [1968] NMLR 253. Prior to this decision, this competence was doubtful given the absolute 
prohibition of judicial review of legislative powers by extant Decree.  
19 See Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers) 1970 (Decree No 28). 
20  See Adejumo v Governor of Lagos State [1972] 1 ALL NLR 159. The Court also considered the same issue in 
the context of a subsequent military dictatorship in Nigeria. See Attorney General of the Federation v Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd, [1999] 9 NWLR 187. The Court of Appeal decision in this case is probably more instructive, 
see Attorney General of the Federation v Guardian Newspapers Ltd, [1995] 5 NWLR 703 (CA).  
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rights litigators turned to international law instead, seizing the opportunity of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.21  In 1983, while Nigeria was in the midst of a 
democratic interregnum from its long period of military rule, it became one of the first parties 
to this Charter to implement it through local legislation.22 There was thus the remarkable 
situation of the African Charter becoming enforceable as domestic law in Nigeria almost three 
years before it entered in force as a treaty. With the re-emergence of military dictatorship soon 
after the domestication of the treaty, the courts accorded the Charter legislation an 
extraordinary quasi- or super-constitutional status. The purpose was to make the Charter rights 
inviolable and superior to any act of a supposedly absolute military dictatorship.23 This was 
possible only because the African Charter had become a formal source of law within Nigeria’s 
domestic legal order, a status that the two UN human rights Covenants, for example, while also 
ratified by Nigeria, do not enjoy. When Frans Viljeon completed a survey of the application of 
the Charter by African courts by the end of the 1990s, he observed,  
[i]t is ironic, but perhaps predictable, that the clearest illustration of the potential effect 
of the African Charter in domestic law is found in Nigeria under a military regime at a 
time of severe repression….24 
 
                                                 
21 27 June 1981, OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev 5, 21 ILM 58 (entered into force 21 October 1986). 
22 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, Laws of the Federation 
1990, Chapter A9 (Nigeria). 
23 See Chima Ubani v Director of State Security Services, [1999] 11 NWLR (Pt 625) 129 (CA) (“In questions or 
issues concerning the fundamental rights protected under the African Charter, the provisions of the African 
Charter are superior to the decrees of the Federal Military Government.”); Fawehinmi v Abacha, [1996] 9 NWLR 
(Pt. 475) 710 (CA), aff’d [2000] 6 NWLR (Pt 660) 228 (SC). The Supreme Court was divided on the extraordinary 
status accorded to the African Charter Act by the Court of Appeal in both cases. In principle, from the perspective 
of the law of treaties and state practice, a statute implementing a treaty, such as the African Charter Act, is legally 
no different from any other legislation. See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 151 (“With dualism the provisions of a treaty which have been incorporated 
into domestic law have the status only of domestic law, and can be amended or repealed by later legislation. If 
such action were to result in breach of the treaty, there would be no remedy in domestic law since there would 
have been no violation of it.”) [emphasis in original]. 
24 See Frans Viljeon, “Application of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights by Domestic Courts in 
Africa” (1999) 43:1 J Afr L 1 at 7. For a discussion of the use of the Charter by Nigerian courts, see Dele Peters, 
“The Domestication of International Human Rights Instruments and Constitutional Litigation in Nigeria” (2000) 
18:3 Neth Q Hum Rts 357 at 368-72. 
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 The impact of this development was huge. Academia, like the judiciary, experienced a 
significant shift as they joined in taking advantage of this resource. 
C. IMPACT ON ACADEMIA 
The drift to international law captured the attention of academic commentators. Law review 
articles and textbooks began to explore and emphasize international human rights norms. The 
impact may be measured by the exponential growth of law review articles exploring 
international dimensions of human rights as well as subjects rarely discussed in the literature, 
such as the right to sustainable development, environmental rights, socio-economic rights, and 
women’s rights. At the same time, law review titles grew rapidly, not just in number but in 
specialization. The Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, for example, launched the 
Journal of Health Law and Policy, the Journal on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, the 
Journal on Law and Development, the Journal on the Right of the Child, the Journal on 
Administration of Justice and Good Governance, and among others. 
D. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM  
With this new resource, the judiciary began to experiment with activist decision-making, 
advancing human rights protection in Nigeria to novel areas. This was thanks in large measure 
to the effort of public interest lawyers and human rights advocacy groups to place these matters 
on the judicial agenda and canvass international norms in support of their arguments. This is 
also important because foreign donors, presumably including Canadian agencies, funded the 
work of most of these advocacy groups. This activism created dynamics whereby lower courts 
sometimes feel unconstrained by the fact that the highest court had previously reviewed a 
subject. To give an example, even though the Supreme Court had ruled the death penalty 
constitutional,25 the Court of Appeal entertained the possibility that the so-called death row 
                                                 
25 Kalu v State, [1998] 13 NWLR 531. 
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phenomenon was a viable basis for a constitutional challenge of the death penalty.26 Although 
this practice may appear to weaken the precedential status of Supreme Court decisions, it was 
simply a creative use of the common law tool of “distinguishing” precedents in order to narrow 
their application. The point is that the zeal to do so was energized by new possibilities opened 
by international law. 
IV. LOOKING TO CANADA 
A. PRIORITY OF RIGHTS 
An important challenge for the judicial application of constitutional rights in Nigeria is the 
provision of justifications for the imposition of limitations on the enjoyment of rights. The 
structure of the limitation of rights under the Nigerian Bill of Rights is structurally very similar 
to that under the European Convention on Human Rights. Nigeria’s bill of rights includes both 
specific and general restrictions of rights. Thus, on the one hand, several provisions have their 
internal modifiers (definitional limitations) that qualify specific right guarantees. Additionally, 
there is a derogation clause that allows the suspension of a few rights during war and 
emergencies. On the other hand, this bill of rights contains a general limitation clause,27 
applicable to most rights, that permits restrictions by laws that are reasonably justifiable in a 
democratic society for certain public interests or for the purpose of protecting the rights of other 
persons. This part of the rights limitation regime under the Nigerian Bill of Rights effectively 
requires an end-means justification. The end or purpose of restricting rights is the promotion 
or protection of the public interest or the protection of the rights of other persons; the means 
                                                 
26 Peter Nemi v Attorney General of Lagos State & Comptroller of Prisons, [1996] 6 NWLR (Pt 542) 42. 
27 The European Convention, like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, does not contain a 
common limitation clause separate from the limitation clauses appended individually to the separate provisions. 
This was the model followed in the original Nigerian Bill of Rights. With the Nigerian Constitution of 1979, 
however, a common limitation clause was introduced to the Nigerian text, replacing the separate limitation 
clauses. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171 (entered into 
force 23 March 1976). 
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chosen to attain that end must be reasonably justifiable, or proportionate, and acceptable in a 
democratic society.28  
 What is remarkable about the public interest limitation under the European Convention 
model, which was followed by Nigeria, is the specification of legitimate public purposes 
(defense, public safety, public order, public morality, and public health are the ones mentioned 
in the Nigerian text). However, the Nigerian Bill of Rights departs from the European text by 
substituting “reasonably justifiable” for the latter’s “necessary.” There was much concern 
among early critics that this semantic switch weakened the protection provided by the former, 
as “reasonably justifiable” was seen as less definitive than “necessary.” It seems, in fact, that 
the purpose of this editorial gloss was precisely to create some flexibility to enable government 
actions pass muster.  
If constitutional rights could simply be overridden at will by the majority, there would 
hardly be any point in specially securing rights.29 Similarly, gratuitous or excessive interference 
with the exercise of rights cannot be reasonably justifiable, certainly not in a democratic 
society. This indicates that a norm of proportionality, or a reasonable balance, must guide the 
relationship between public interests and the means chosen to protect them. Originally a 
concept of German and European law, proportionality has emerged as a universal principle of 
public law;30 a standard for justification (as “reasonableness,” the specific standard of the 
Nigerian bill of rights) of the restriction of rights and, in general, moderation in exercise of the 
                                                 
28 See David Beatty, Constitutional Law in Theory and Practice (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995) at 
68.  
29 Ronald Dworkin put it quite starkly: “The existence of rights against the Government would be jeopardized if 
the Government were able to defeat such a right by appealing to the right of a democratic majority to work its 
will. A right against the Government must be a right to do something even the majority thinks it would be wrong 
to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for having it done.” See Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriously (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977) at 194. 
30 See Aharon Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012); Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Iddo Porat, Proportionality and Constitutional Culture 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); N Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in European Law: 
A Comparative Study (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996) at Chapter 2. 
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public power.31 Accordingly, proportionality tests are widely applied by national courts, from 
Australia32 and Canada33 to South Africa,34 Tanzania, Zambia,35 and elsewhere. They are also 
applied by the European Court of Human Rights36 and the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights,37 among other international tribunals. In fact, proportionality is broadly 
embraced by courts around the world.38 
Proportionality adjudication positions courts to exercise dominance over policy 
making,39 and since it shifts the focus from authority (formal constitutional or statutory power, 
authorization, etc.) to justification, the government is required to justify its actions on 
substantive grounds,40 thereby engendering a culture of accountability. Judicial review in 
Nigeria has traditionally focused more on the formal validity of government actions. 
B. WOMEN AND MINORITIES PROTECTION 
Statutory and constitutional protections of women’s rights have increased in recent years in 
Nigeria. Several national and sub-national legislation address the prevention and punishment 
of physical, sexual, and psychological violence against women, including, notably, the recent 
Violence against Persons (Prohibition) Act 2015, which implements the UN Declaration on 
                                                 
31 Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, “Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitutionalism” (2008) 47 Colum 
J Transnat’l L 72. 
32 See Jeremy Kirk, “Constitutional Guarantees, Characterization and the Concept of Proportionality” (1997) 21 
Melb UL Rev 1. 
33 See R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd, [1985] 1 SCR 295 at 352, 18 DLR (4th) 321 (stating that “a form of 
proportionality test” is required to assess whether the means chosen to achieve government objectives are 
reasonable). See especially R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 53 OR (2d) 719 (establishing the definitive 
proportionality test for application of section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights). It has been said, the Oakes 
proportionality test “has taken on some of the character of holy writ.” PW Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada, 
student ed (Scarborough, ON: Carswell, 2002) at 779. 
34 State v Makwanyane, [1995] 3 SA 391 at para 104 (CC). 
35 Pumbun v Attorney General, [1993] 3 LRC 317 at 323 (Tanzania CA); Mulundika & ors v People, [1995-1997] 
Zambia LR 20 at 27 (Zambia SC). 
36 See Sunday Times v United Kingdom (1979-80), 2 EHRR 245.  
37 See Media Rights Agenda & Constitutional Rights Project v Nigeria (2000), 7 IHRR 265 at para 42. For 
discussion, see Gino Naldi, “Limitation of Rights under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The 
Contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights” (2001) 17:1 S Afr J Hum Rts 109. 
38 The notable exception is the United States. See Bernhard Schlink, “Proportionality in Constitutional Law: Why 
Everywhere but Here?” (2012) 22:2 Duke J Comp & Intl L 291; Jud Mathews & Alec Stone, “All Things in 
Proportion? American Rights Review and the Problem of Balancing” (2011) 60:4 Emory LJ 797. 
39 Sweet & Mathews, supra note 31 at 78. 
40 Cohen-Eliya & Porat, supra note 30 at 111. 
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the Elimination of Violence against Women.41  Currently, the National Assembly is considering 
the Gender and Equal Opportunities Bill 2016. Yet, the jurisprudence of women’s rights is not 
well developed. Minorities protection in Nigeria focuses mainly on ethnic minorities in practice 
although the Constitution expressly protects other discrete disadvantaged groups, e.g. by 
forbidding unequal treatment on account of sex, religion, political opinion, etc. Canadian 
jurisprudence offers valuable resources to advance legal protection in these areas. 
 
C. COURT-ACADEMY CO-OPERATION 
The channeling of inputs from the academy into the judicial process in Nigeria is far from 
satisfactory. The experience of the Supreme Court of Canada in this respect is quite instructive. 
James Snell and Frederick Vaughan have observed that judicial appointment to the Court, 
especially since 1970, of judges with strong scholarly background “accounts for the greater 
willingness of the Court to assume a more creative role.”42 This is interesting because although 
there is in fact a definite ascendancy in intra-judicial recruitment,43 at least 70 per cent of the 
justices appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada since 1970 previously held an academic 
position in a university, many of them being full-time law professors. This is a strong indication 
that academic reputation is an important consideration in recruitment to the Canadian Supreme 
Court. It has indeed been claimed for a fact that “the modern criteria for service on the Supreme 
Court include either academic reputation or appellate judicial experience or both.”44 While this 
pattern of recruitment may partly explain why academic citations have become an important 
                                                 
41  GA Res A/RES/48/104, UNGAOR, 48th Sess (1993). 
42 James G Snell & Frederick Vaughan, The Supreme Court of Canada (Toronto: Osgoode Society, 1985) at 231. 
43 Some observers have suggested that a rule has crystallized already that at any given time the Court includes 
seven members elevated from the provincial courts of appeal, one from the Federal Court of Appeal, and one 
without prior judicial experience. See Peter McCormick, Supreme at Last: The Evolution of the Supreme Court 
of Canada (Toronto: James Lorimer & Co., 2000) at 108 [McCormick, Supreme at Last]. See also Ian Greene et 
al, Final Appeal: Decision-Making in Canadian Courts of Appeal (Toronto: Lorimer, 1998) at 101. 
44  See McCormick, Supreme at Last, ibid.  
HUMAN RIGHTS DISCOURSES IN NIGERIA ACROSS TIME 
resource in decision-making,45 resulting in much longer opinions,46 that may also be the result 
of increased participation of law clerks in the business of the Court47 and of vigorous interest 
group litigation. The law clerks, it may be said, because they are fresh from the universities 
and mostly likely to subsequently take up an academic career, bring the law school to the Court, 
thereby “serving as the conveyor belt from the law schools to the inner sanctum of the Supreme 
Court.”48 Their importance is underscored by the fact that, during the 80s, the number of law 
clerks assigned to each justice tripled. 
 Unlike the situation in Canada, until recently most Supreme Court justices in Nigeria 
did not have graduate school education, any experience in university teaching, or service in the 
higher echelon of the civil service outside the Legal Department or Ministry of Justice. Just 
over a dozen of the over one hundred justices appointed to the Court thus far need a graduate 
degree in law (including 7 who held PhDs), but only 6 were law school professors prior to their 
judicial careers. It is unlikely that this pattern will improve in the foreseeable future, because 
of the current practice of exclusively appointing senior justices of the Court of Appeal to the 
Supreme Court. As seniority comes with long judicial service, frequently running over twenty 
years, it must now be considered exceptional for a potential candidate for the Supreme Court 
of Nigeria to have had some distinguished career outside the judiciary.  
 
 
                                                 
45 See Peter McCormick, “Do Judges Read Books, Too? Academic Citations by the Lamer Court 1991-96” (1998) 
9 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 463 [McCormick, “Judges Read”]; Gordon Bale, “W.R. Lederman and the Citation of 
Periodicals by the Supreme Court of Canada” (1994) 19 Queen’s LJ 36; Vaughan Black & Nicholas Richter, “Did 
She Mention My Name? Citation of Academic Authority by the Supreme Court of Canada 1985-1990” (1993) 
Dal LJ 377.  
46 McCormick reported that the average Supreme Court of Canada decision using academic citations (fifty pages) 
is more than twice the length of the average decision that did not use citations (twenty pages). See McCormick, 
“Judges Read”, ibid at 473. 
47 See Lorne Sossin, “The Sounds of Silence: Law Clerks, Policy-Making and the Supreme Court of Canada” 
(1996) 30 UBC L Rev 279; Greene et al, supra note 43 at 109-14. 
48 Frederick Lee Morton & Rainer Knopff, The Charter Revolution and the Court Party (Peterborough, ON: 
Broadview Press, 2000) at 112.  
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V. CONCLUSION: A RESEARCH AGENDA 
A. LIBERAL RIGHTS, MODERNITY AND TRADITION 
A criticism of Nigeria’s constitutional bill of rights is that it was intended to replicate closely, 
perhaps too closely, the first section of the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Except for the right to marry, practically every European 
Convention right is included in the Nigerian Bill of Rights, although two or three provisions 
come from other sources. Hence, the Nigerian Bill of Rights carries the European Convention’s 
imprint of a “narrowly individualistic view of society.”49 The Nigerian instrument, therefore, 
has been correctly observed to be “the conduit for the importation of the Western articulation 
of the concept of human rights into modern African human rights law.”50 This is significant in 
itself, because the liberal assumption of moral individualism is presumably out of sync with 
the supposedly communitarian character of African communities.51 This may be an 
impediment to the reception of certain aspects of Canadian human rights jurisprudence in 
                                                 
49 See Keith D Ewing & Conor A Gearty, “Rocky Foundations for Labor’s New Rights” (1997) Eur HRL Rev 
146 at 150. 
50  Christoff Heyns, “African Human Rights Law and the European Convention” (1993) 11 S Afr J Hum Rts 252 
at 258. Cf Karel Vasak, who claims the European Convention “has found a fertile ground for its expansion in 
other continents, no doubt because of its intrinsic virtues, and because it is not tied to a European concept of 
man.” See Karel Vasak, “European Convention of Human Rights beyond the Frontiers of Europe” (1963) 12 Intl 
& Comp LQ 1206 [emphasis added].  
51 As Leopold Senghor put it, “in Europe, Human Rights are considered as a body of principles and rules placed 
in the hands of the individual, as a weapon, thus enabling him to defend himself against the group or entity 
representing it. In Africa, the individual and his right are wrapped in the protection of the family and other 
communities. …Rights in Africa…cannot be separated from the obligations due to the family and other 
communities.” (Address to a meeting of independent experts drafting the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights) OAU DOC CAB/LEG/67/5, quoted in Fatsah Ouguergouz, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2003) at 377-78. For a case study of communitarian-individualist elements of African bills of rights, see 
Adrien Katherine Wing, “Communitarianism vs. Individualism: Constitutionalism in Namibia and South Africa” 
(1993) 11 Wis Intl LJ 295. A recent forceful restatement of the case for a radical communitarian African concept 
of human rights is Makau wa Mutua, “The Banjul Charter and the African Cultural Fingerprint: An Evaluation of 
the Language of Duties” (1995) 35 Va J International L 339. See further, Ifeanyi A Menkiti, “Person and 
Community in African Traditional Thought” in RA Wright, ed, African Philosophy: An Introduction, 3rd ed 
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984) 171. But the case for the ontological primacy of the community 
in [traditional] Africa is perhaps overstated. See Kwame Gyekye, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical 
Reflections on the African Experience (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997) at 35-76 (arguing that the 
African experience may be more accurately classified as moderate communitarian).  
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Nigeria. It must be equally emphasized however that the defining mark of the Nigerian bill of 
rights are individual rights. To discount this would defeat its purpose altogether. 
 This understanding of constitutional rights as individual rights requires some 
clarification in the judicial application of African bills of rights. Although the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights introduced a paradigm shift with its inclusion of solidarity 
rights, duties of persons, and coupling of individual rights with claw back clauses, the African 
Charter jurisprudence indicates that individual rights are not expected to yield lightly to “public 
interest” claims. Therefore, although this is not necessarily a model similar to Dworkin’s rights-
as-trumps, there is no doubt that both share a common aspiration of the priority of rights. The 
challenge is to develop a clear elucidation of the interaction of the individual and the 
community in the application of African bills of rights and hence the suitability of comparative 
law as a judicial resource. If the pedigree of the Nigerian bill of rights, and indeed other African 
bills of rights, counts for anything, it follows that there is no easy resolution of this problem. 
 
B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS 
In spite of the productive deployment of international norms in human rights litigation and 
advocacy in Nigeria since the 1980s, the use of international law in judicial decision-making 
remains far from satisfactory. A possible problem is that too many Nigerian judges are not 
sufficiently familiar with the subject. On the surface, it may partly be because it is not a 
compulsory subject in the LL.B. curriculum. However, it may also be that judges are 
challenged as to its relevance in the daily grist of adjudication. A closer scrutiny may 
nevertheless uncover complex reasons for the international law gap in human rights 
adjudication in Nigeria. 
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C. JUDICIAL CAPACITY 
Although the manifest judicial authority of the Nigerian courts (government compliance with 
specific decisions and compliance over time) is not necessarily all that weak, their latent 
authority (the preventive or disciplinary function of courts)52 remains far from satisfactory. 
One factor at play is that policy issues may not be accepted by the public as something to be 
resolved judicially as a matter of individual rights. Take, for example, the recent controversial 
school uniform policy of Osun State in southwestern Nigeria, which permits Muslim school 
girls to wear the hijab over school uniforms. Christian parents and organizations have persisted 
in rejecting the policy even after a High Court determined that the policy was constitutionally 
valid. 
Granted that proportionality analysis is a valuable tool for transparent balancing, it is a 
mistake to suppose that it will by itself correct undue judicial deference in human rights 
adjudication to government policy choices.53 Judicial assertiveness grows with institutional 
power. David Easton attributed this process to increasing diffuse support: 
a reservoir of favorable attitudes or goodwill that helps members accept or tolerate 
outputs to which they are opposed and the effect of which they see as damaging to their 
wants.54 
 
Diffuse support therefore differs from the more limited support arising from satisfaction 
with a court’s specific policy (specific support). While low diffuse support may co-exist with 
a high specific support, Gibson, Calderia, and Baird reported findings showing that the 
legitimacy of national high courts slowly evolves from the accumulation of satisfied 
                                                 
52 See Siri Gloppen, “The Accountability Function of the Courts in Tanzania and Zambia” (2003) 10:4 
Democratization 112. 
53  Cf. Basil Ugochukwu, “Balancing, Proportionality, and Human Rights Adjudication in Comparative Context: 
Lessons for Nigeria” (2004) 1:1 Transnational Hum Rts Rev. 
54  David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: Wiley, 1965) 273. According to Gibson, “diffuse 
support emerges as the best predictor of compliance: those who are supportive of the Court are significantly more 
likely to comply with its decisions even when they are disagreeable” See James L Gibson, “Understandings of 
Justice: Institutional Legitimacy, Procedural Justice and Political Tolerance” (1989) 23 Law & Soc’y Rev 469 at 
489. 
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constituents.55 On the other hand, prolonged dissatisfaction with decisions of a court may erode 
diffuse support. African courts during the first decades after colonialism would, therefore, not 
have had sufficient time to accumulate specific support. Rather, their generally unsatisfactory 
decision-making displeased many civil society constituencies. 
Where the judiciary’s institutional power is weak (i.e. low diffuse support), its output 
in rights cases is likely to show excessive deference to the government. We saw this with the 
early decisions of the Supreme Court of Nigeria. The same experience is observed elsewhere 
in Africa. For example, in the case of Kenya’s previous constitutional bill of rights the Kenyan 
courts’ almost extraordinary judicial reticence56 was partly the natural result of what Makau 
Mutua characterized as a culture of judges thinking “like civil servants and ruling party 
stalwarts,”57 fostered by a severe crisis of judicial independence. It is not surprising, as Yash 
                                                 
55 For example, see ibid. 
56 See Yash Ghai, “The Kenya Bill of Rights: Theory and Practice” in Philip Alston, ed, Promoting Human Rights 
Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999) at 224; YP Ghai 
& JPWB McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya: A Study of the Legal Framework of Government 
from Colonial Times to the Present (London: Oxford University Press, 1970) at 413-30; Gibson Kamau Kuria & 
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Makau Mutua, “Justice under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in Kenya” (2001) 23 Hum Rts 
Q 96; DS Days et al, Justice Enjoined: the State of the Judiciary in Kenya (New York: RF Kennedy Memorial 
Center for Human Rights, 1992); Shadrack BO Gutto, “Constitutional Law and Politics in Kenya since 
Independence: a Study in Class and Power in a Neo-Colonial State in Africa” (1987) 5 Zimbabwe L Rev 142; 
Susanne D Mueller, “Government and Opposition in Kenya, 1966-9” (1984) 22 J Mod Afr Stud 399; Makau wa 
Mutua, “Human Rights and State Despotism in Kenya: Institutional Problems” (1994) Africa Today 50. 
57  Mutua, “Justice under Siege”, supra note 55 at 113. Ojwang and Otienu-Odek provided a similar 
explanation.   
The outcome of human rights litigation in Kenya appears to turn on four primary considerations: (i) Is 
there a guiding principle on the subject matter that is of critical centrality to the operation of the executive 
arm of government? (ii) If there is such a fundamental policy, has it been given ultimate instrumental 
character through legislative action? (iii) Has the relevant act been done, or decision taken in a casual 
context, or at the behest of an individual officer acting purely on his own? (iv) Is the matter in question 
covered by an exhaustive body of constitutional or ordinary legal rules and principles? 
When the subject of official action is governed by a fundamental policy consideration, the courts are 
likely to accord deference to the position of the State. In that case, the courts tend to show interpretative 
restraint in approaching the conflicting claims made by the State and the individual respectively…. Such 
is still more emphatically the approach of the Kenya courts where guiding government policy has 
crystallized into an instrumental form through the legislative act. In such a case, the court will be reluctant 
to uphold the individual claim that goes against the official position. Constitutional interpretation will 
then appear to be built around an acceptance of such a primary position. The court appears to proceed by 
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Ghai and McAuslan reported, as far as the bill of rights in the 1960 Constitution is concerned, 
“it is difficult to trace a single case in which the Bill was successfully invoked.”58 
This article has provided an overview of Nigeria’s experience with judicial application 
of its bill of rights. We saw that the court’s initial highly deferential approach evolved towards 
activism as changes in political institutions necessitated strategic uses of courts by some of its 
constituents. However, without a proportionality analysis firmly established in adjudication 
neither the quality of output nor the challenge of judicial deference can reach a satisfactory 
state. It is suggested that engagement with Canada can provide opportunities and possible 
solutions with respect to this issue.  
 
 
                                                 
asking: (i) is it more important to decide in a manner that respects the known position of the other 
institutions of government (principally the executive)?, or (ii) is it more important to be guided by, and 
to uphold, the established legal doctrines, principles and rules? The first alternative generally becomes 
the basis of decision-making. Ojwang & Otieno-Odek, supra note 55 at 48-49 [emphasis in original].  
See PJ Kabudi, Human Rights Jurisprudence in East Africa: A Comparative Study of Fundamental Rights and 
Freedoms of the Individual in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 1995) at 
348-49. Uganda had a similar experience. See J Oloka-Onyango, “Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in 
Uganda: A Historical Perspective” in M Mamdani & J Oloka-Onyango, eds, Uganda: Studies in Living 
Conditions, Popular Movements, and Constitutionalism (Vienna: Journal fűr Entwicklungspolitik, 1994) 463 at 
480-500, 503-11.  
58 Ghai & McAuslan, supra note 55 at 413. 
